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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STArl'E O.F' UTAH, by and Through 
its ROAD COMMISSION, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
- vs. -
F'. FJPHHAil\f BATES and 
MAF. I'. BATES, 
Dr;feudants and Appellants. 
Case 
No.10910 
RESPO,NDENT'S BRIEF 
srrA TE ME NT OF THE CASE 
This is an action in eminent domain brought by the 
Stah1 Road Commission and this action is ancillary to a 
J!llOJ' action. rrhe original proceeding in eminent domain 
inrolved the taking of land for the Interstate Highway 
proper, and tlw ancillary proceeding was for land to 
ronstruct a Rtock trail along the Interstate Highway. 
'f'lie Respondent claims that severance damage ·was paid 
to tlt1' A ppc•llants in the prior proceeding which included 
ilanrngps fur loss of access to water in Silver Creek and, 
lhrrefor<', is uot obligated to pay for the same loss of 
'r:1tPr and aeress in the second proceeding. Appellants 
1 
claim that Respondent is obligated to furniRlt 11 at 1,1 or 
pay additional compensation in tlw ancillary prncePdiii~ 
DISPOSITION IN LO"\VER C'OUHT 
The case was pre-tried and tried to the Co11l't, Nt 011 _ 
art M. Hanson, .Judge, presiding without a jmy, and tlir· 
Court granted .Judgment of $3:> per a ere JHHsu;rn( io 
stipulation of counsels, on 8.71 aen•s taken by the B1·-
pondent for the construction of the stoek trnil. ']1]i 1, 
Court also found that the Appellants ha(1 het•n paid for 
the loss of aecess to their water by the prior easr which 
was settled between the parties, and tlH'r0forP, ~tppel­
lants "\Vere not entitled to furtht>r ReYeraue(• dmnngr 011 
the ancillary proceeding. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff-Respondent Reeks an affirnia11cr of tltr 
trial Court's finding and .Judgment to the effret that tlw 
Defendants-Appellants are not entitled to further .,er-
erance damage for loss of aecess to their 1rntrr in th': 
ancillary proceeding. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In 1959, the Utah State Road Commission hega11 
land acquisition in the area known as Siker Creek Can-
yon which extends approximately from Siln•r CrePk 
Junction to Wanship, Summit County, Utal1. Thr land 
acquisition program was part of the onrall Intrrst:tll' 
construction program and the land of the A ppellanh "ri' 
part of the land acquired for the construction of tl11 lit 
terstate High·way. 
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Prior to the construction of the Interstate High-
,1 ay, the Appellants watered their livestock in Silver 
( 'rt'L'lc 8tream by crossing the old highway which sepa-
rated Appellants' land from Silver Creek. The new In-
terclate system, pursuant to Interntate requirements, 
rloe, 1111t permit crossings across the highway and, there-
f1,n·, tl1r A ppdlants' right to iugress and egress from 
rlll'ir rf'maining land had to be purchased by paying the 
.1ppellm1ts severance damage. One of the items of sev-
f'l'i\llt'e 1lnmnge was the loss of access to the water in Sil-
1r·r Creek as indicated by exhibits P-5 and P-6, which 
11rr· npprnisals, oMaiued h>' the Utah State Road Com-
mi~sion. Based upon such appraisals, a warrant>T deed, 
(r·xhihit P-2) was signed hy the Appellants conveying to 
thr 11tali State Road Commission, the necessary land and 
thr ah:-:olutc right to control ingress and egress from the 
.\pp1'llants' larnl to or from the new Interstate system. 
In '·011sideration for the c01weyance of land and the right 
!11 eon I rnl ingress and egress to and from the Interstate 
'lc:tcm from Appellants' land, the Utah State Road Com-
missio11 paid to Appellants, the sum of $8864.00, plus 
i11tPrPst (exhibit P-3). 
In 1963, the Utah State Road Commission initiated 
proceNlings to acquire additional land for the construc-
lion of certain stock trails along the Interstate system 
from Sih·cr Creek Junction to Wanship, and the Ap-
prllm1tf::' land was again affected by the project. The 
lm1d being taken by Respondent, the Utah State Road 
l'11mmissio11, borders along the now eonstructed Inter-
'tntP s)·stem and the Appellants claim that they are 
3 
again entitled to compensation for the los8 of acci,,, 
to water in Silver Creek. The Respondent denies th;ii 
they are again entitled to such compensation sinrt· t]i,, 
original settlement included payment for control of 
Appellants' access to the water. 
Based upon the controversy aho\'e descrihrd thr-
case was pretried and subsequently tried hy the Honor-
able Stewart M. Hanson, Judge, sitting ·with out a jm). 
Counsel for Respondent was not certain as to what relief 1 
Appellants sought at the trial level exc<:>pt for the fact 
that Appellants, throughout the entire trial. insi8trd that ' 
they were entitled to severance damage on tlw ancilfory 
case. However, the arguments submitted by Counsel for 
Appellants appeared to he direeted to-wards mistake anr1 
misrepresentation and as such, appeare<l to be directed 
towards a recision of the original contract. 
Therefore, at pre-trial and prior to such datt>, corn1-
sel for the Respondent offered the Appellants an oppor-
tunity to try all of the issues including the is8ues of ~e\'­
Erance damage from the initial taking and the i8sucs of 
loss of access to Silver Creek by the construction of tltP 
Highway itself and the stock trail, provided, howewr. 
that the Appellants return to the Respondent the sum of 
$8864.00, plus interest, which had been paid hy the prior 
settlement. At the pre-trial, the same offer was again 
made to the Appellants by counsel for the Rcspondeu1 1 
and the Court initially ruled that the Appellants refn 111l 
the money to Respondent and the issues of compcm;atiun 
and damages arising from the construction of the high-
way and the construction of the stock trail lw pla('Pd lw-
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lore the court in an effort to arrive at an eciuitable clis-
1111.sition (If the entire case. (TR Feb. 17, 1967, Page 12, 
;inc ]:i tl1rough page 19, line 2.) 
'J'lw Apprllants, however, decided against refund-
;11!( 1]1P money obtained by them through the prior pro-
1·1 cdiup; a 11c1, therefore a trial was held on the issues of 
] 11 ]1(! value for tl1e ancillary proceeding and also in-
l'irnli!rl in that trial was the issue of whether or not com-
1w11satio11 for loss of access to the water should be m-
1l111lcc1 as damages in the ancillary proceeding. 
'rhe Court ruled that the Appellants were entitled 
to tlll' y;Jlue of the land taken in the ancillary proceeding 
hnt that the Appellants were not entitled to further sev-
erance clamnge 011 the land remaining, since the Appel-
Lrnt< had heen prrviously paid for the loss of access to 
tilt· watrr h~, the earlier proceeding. 
ARGUMENT 
POINTS I AND II 
'l1HE COURT DID NOT ERR IN FINDING 
'l1HAT THE PURPORTED AGREEMENT BY 
ALDEN S. ADAMS WAS NOT BINDING AND 
THAT THE APPELLANTS ARE NOT EN-
TITLED TO ANY FURTHER COMPENSA-
TION . 
. \ prwllants' ar,g·ument of Point One and Point Tvvo 
,ir1· ~nh~tantially the same and arise from the same fac-
iunl ~it nation and, therefore, Respondent will submit its 
ni~unwnts of Point One and Point Two under one 
l11•adino· ,.,. 
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The Appellants attack the finding of the Coutt 1
11 
· 
stating that the Court erred in finding the rnnporri.
11 
agreement made by Alden S. Adams was 110t hill!]ii.
1 
.. 
upon the Respondents. The Appellants suggest th:i, 
there was no evidence contradicting their position that 
the letters written by Alden S. Adams (D-7 and D-~I 
were, in fact, binding upon the State. This eontcntion, 
however, presumes that the letters heretoforl' ref~rrPd 
to were either contracts in and of themselves or tlrnt thr1 
were an integral part of the right of way agreement mi1I 
the warranty deed executed hy the Appellants i11 faYo1· 
of the Respondent. The letters, lwwever, arr not suf-
ficiently clear to be called contracts i11 and of tltemsp]w, 
and do not specify any contingeneies for the signing- of 
the warranty deed or the right nf way contract. ThP 
right of way contract and the warrant_\' deed do not in 
any way ref er to any contingencies nor refer to the let-
ters written by Alden S. Adams. Therefore, it mu>t 1 
he presumed that the Trial Court did not feel that tli1• 
letters created any contractual obligation other thm1 il) 
specified in the warranty deed and the right of waY 
contract. 
Even if it were to be conceded, for the Rake of thi> 
argument, that the the letters referred to by the Appel-
lants created contractual liability in favor of . .:\ppellauti 
and against Respondent, the question of whether or not 
the State Road Commission could be bound hy such cn 11 · 
tract would still be in issue in that the authority of ,\Jr 
Alden S. Adams would have to be ascertained and e~­
tablished. Appellants argue that Mr. Adams was ve.,frll 
with sufficient authority and discretion to hind the State 
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Hoad Commission to whatever terms Mr. Adams deter-
mined m~c·Pssa ry for the procurement of Appellants' 
lnJ1d. To support this contention, Appellants cite 43 
1111 , .!ttr, 71, Srdion 254. However, Appellants cite only 
il'ltctt is connmient for them to argue and omit such parts 
!I.~ nre pertinent to the question before the Court. The 
inw mcm1i11g of the section is conveyed in the following 
,~utcnces: 
"vVhen power or jurisdiction is delegated to any 
publif' officer over a subject matter and its exer-
eise is confided to his discretion, the acts done in 
the exercise of the authority are, in general, bind-
ing and valid as to the subject matter. The only 
(jllCStion 1ch ich can arise between an individual and 
the public, or any person denying the rnlidity 
n re zw ICC r in the officer and frand in the party." 
(F~mphasis added) 
'l'hc citation goes on further to say: 
"~1n unauthorized act or declaration of an officer 
does not Pstop the government from insisting on 
its incalidity." Id. Page 72. (Emphasis added) 
In further support of Appellants' position, they cite 
±3 Am, .fur. 85, Section 273. Appellants claim that this 
section stands for the proposition that all that is neces-
sary for the letters written by Mr. Alden S. Adams to 
he binding upon the State is to show that the matters 
propor-;cd hy 1\fr. Adams need only have been more or less 
counPdecl with his general duties. However, the section 
11rn 1tNl h.1' Appellants does not support this contention 
aud i:-: quoted out of context by Appellants. The citation 
l'onwl in Appellants' brief on page 15, refers to the 
lialiil1ty of a public officer for acts committed beyond 
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his authority and refers to the question of his per~r, 11 ,11 
liability and not to the validity of any contractual 0111; 
gations created by him beyond the scope of his autlj()ri:) 
Moreover, the question of agency being a Yitai qul, 
tion of the Appellants' case, should be i:;iven somr co
11
_ 
sideration and merits sornc> discussion. In :1 Am. J 11 r. 2d 
481, 482, Section 77, we find the following statement 0r 
the law: 
"It is always competent for a principal to liml , 
the authority of his agent and if such limitatio11, 
have been brought to the attention of thr p:1rli-
with whom the ag-ent is dealing the power to liiwl , 
the principal is defined thereby. Accordingly, thr 
_general rule is that one who deals with an agent, 
knowing that he is clothed with a limited or rir-
cumscrihed authority and that his art tra11.;;r•rJ11], , 
his powers, cannot hold his principal. This i, 
true whether the agent is a general or a sprci~I 
one, for a principal ma~T limit the anthorit~· of onii 
as well as the other. Clearly, a limitation hy the 
principal of the agent's authority commnnicalf'cl 
to a third party is effective to excuse th0 principill ' 
from liability to that third pa rt~T for arts by the 
agent in excess of the limit prescribed; and a pPr-
son dealing with an agent must usE' reasonable 
diligence and prudence- to ascertain whethrr the 1 
agent is acting within the scope of his power~. It 
follows that the principal is not bound, rm the 
basis of either actual or apparent a1dhority. if 
the thi~d person dealing with the ape11.f k1101cs or i 
should know, the limitations placed by thr pri11- • 
cipal on the agent's authority and that the a11r11f ; 
is exteeding it. 
"Whenerer a. person who dealt with a11 agrnl 
had notice of lack of authority or was put 011 ''.1° 
tice by the circumstan('es, is ordinarily a quesf'/IJ// 
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of facts fnr the trier of facts, and not one of law." 
( ~~mphasis added) 
ln n'viewing the evidence most favorable to the 
, 11 cl·e,;;sful party at trial, namely, the Respondent, it is 
1,ot ,Jjfficnlt to understand how the trial court arrived at 
ir: decision. The State Road Commission right of way 
contrad referred to Mr. Alden S. Adams as an escrow 
;1gP11t anll the terms stated in the contract were subject 
lo approval by the State Road Commission and the final 
1·:;(•cnled document indicates that, in fact, the approval 
,if thl' SI n tc Road Commission was obtained 9 days suh-
,11qul'llt to th(' date of the contract (exhibit D-7) and the 
11xeeutio11 hy the AppPllants. If the contracts were read 
!:\the Appellants, as conreclcd by ~Ir. F. Ephraim Bates, 
.\11prllants were ginn sufficient notice of the limited au-
ll1orit.v· of l\fr. Alden S. Adams and were required to 
i111p1ire into his authority. The question of whether Ap-
lH%rnt.c: had sufficient notice of authority or whether 
\ppl'llants were put on notiee hy the circumstances sur-
1011rnli11g the transaction, being a question of fact to be 
1ldenui11rd by the try er of the facts, it must be presumed 
:o han• been decided in favor of the successful party at 
lriul, narnrly the Respondents. 
Next, the Appellants feel that they are the victims 
of either misrepresentation or misunderstanding of the 
trrms of the right of way contract (P-3) or wording of 
ll1e wanauty deed (P-2) and in support of such con-
li·n1 ion insist that the letters from l\fr. Alden S. Adams 
1 IL/ <111(1 D-8) are adequate proof of their position . 
. \ <'arpfu] reading of the letters, however, and all of 
'lie· d<1c·nrnents on exhibit in no way establishes that the 
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terms of the right of way agreement or the \\arran\ 
deed are contingent upon the State paying the Appel 
lants additional severance damage or providiug 8 nh~ 1 ; 
tute facilities for watering li\·estock. On the contrun 
the ·warranty deed clearly emphasized the faet thnt n;
1
: ~ 
State was purchasing land from the Appellants togdher 
with controlled access and i11 clear print on the top of 
the page of the warranty deed we find the word~ in p:i 
renthesis "controlled access." Again, in tlw la:-;t pnra 
graph of the warranty deed we find that tlic Aprwllant~ 
conveyed to Respondents "a1l rights of i119re.-·s to 1u11! 
egress from the remaining pro1Jerty config11011s to ln111is 
hereby conveyed to or from said higl111'ay." 
In exhibit P-3 we find that each sentence inclntlt~' 
the words ''damages for controlled access'' and !he 
''control of egress and ingress from and to the high-
way from Appellants' land'' is emphasized fin timi''· 
The Appellants were full:- apprised that thc eonstrnr-
tion of the Interstate highway would prennt them from 
gaining access to the ·water in Silver Creek and 011 t•r11,;<-
examination, J\Ir. F. Ephraim Bates, one of tl1c AppPl-
lants, testified that he signed the same. ('J'R. Feb. ~(I 
and 23, 1967, page 27, line 22 to page 28, line Hi.) Under 
these circumstances, it is difficult to understand ho11 
the Appellants could hm·e misunderstoo(l or could lime 
been mislead by misrepresentation as to the terms of th1 
right of way contract and the deed which the~- executed 
in behalf of the State of Utah. 
Assuming, for the sake of tbr arg-umrnt, !ha! tlil· 
Appellants were mislead by certain statements a11c1 docn-
10 
nwids, or assummg that the Appellants misunderstood 
tJw terms of the right of way contract arnl the Deed exe-
l'nted hy them, Appellants were given numerous opportu-
nitil'S to rescind all contracts and agreements of settle-
uwnt aml re-try the prior lawsuit together with the sub-
,1.,111e11t lawsuit in a single hearing to provide them the 
rpporhmity to remedy whatever injustice the Appel-
lau!s frlt lwfrll them from such misrepresentations or 
nu~mHlcrstanclings. Counsel for Respondent, prior to 
any !1earillg-, offered to re-try the elltire case and coun-
oel for Hespomlent made such offer again at pre-trial. 
flnr lo the Appellants' claim of misrepresentation and 
misunderstanding-, tlw Court ruled that all of the issues 
,!Jould he re-tried in one single hearing and the Appel-
]p,11ts t;lionlrl refnncl to Respondent any sums received by 
:\wcllants on the prior proceeding together with inter-
1·st aR a condition to re-try the entire lawsuit. The Ap-
pellants ''ere given six months to repay the sum received 
liy tlwm, namely, $8864.00. N ot"withstanding all of the 
r,ffns to re-try the entire lawsuit, the Appellants refused 
tn n'fund the necessary money and re-try the case. The 
Appellants insisted on being paid additional sums over 
~nr1 above what was originally received by them for the 
nllegecl deprivation of watering facilities and control of 
aeeess. If it may be assumed that the Appellants be-
licYrd that the warranty deed and right of way contract 
'igned by them carried with it certain contingencies 
11liich WNe not fulfilled, and if Respondent believed that 
tlte ('\ecntion of the documents carried no contingencies, 
:Ill' effort of such bilateral mistake is to nullify the 
1
'
11111 rnd. (17 Am. Jur. 2d, 491, Contracts, Sections 143 
11 
and 144.) Further, assuming Appellants' mo 8t 8u1.1· ' 011, 
accusations to be true, namely, that the Respondent \\;
1
, 
guilty of misrepresentation in inducing Appellanh 
1
,, 
execute the deed and contract for procurement of Jii"I· 
'I 
way right of way, the remedy is still avoic1ancr of tJ
1
,, 
documents executed. (17 Am . .Jur., 501 through 506, l'ori. ! 
tracts, Section 151 to 154.) Appellants were afforrlP: •. 
several opportunities to avoid the terms of the (h·: 
ments complained of awl to present evidence to sh11i, 
what they believed to be just compensation for the qJi1 '1 
of the land taken and severance to the remaining la11il I 
The Appellants refused this remedy. i 
Upon election of the Appellants, a trial wa8 he],! i 
which was restricted to the issues of land valuei,; for tli1 
1 
additional taking and Appellants also put on evitle11e(' ! 
in an attempt to show that tlH7 were entitled to addi ! 
tional damages from the control of access ancl the allrgcil 
deprivation of water. The Respondent put on evidrmr · 
to contradict such evidence. The Court found again<! 
the Appellants and in favor of the Respondent, holdi11~ 
that the Appellants were paid for their alleged c1rpri1a 
tion of water and severance to the land remaining in till' , 
prior proceeding and, therefore, should not reeorn 
again for the same items and, therefore, onl~T the value of 
the land for the additiom1l taking was inclmle<l in th1· : 
award to the Appellants. 
The Appellants now complain that the affirmauce of 
the Trial Court's findings would cause Appellants tn 
suffer manifest injustice from unfair d0a!i11gs allCl in 
equities and such affirmance would, in essenee, permit thl' 
12 
Hc~polJ(lcnt to renege on its agreement and obligation . 
. \ppc!laHts fnrther argue that to demand that they re-
inru the money received by them to the Respondellt, the 
;:itatc Road Commission, after these many years with in-
trmt as suggested by the Court, places them at a great 
clisndrnntagr. It should be noted that the Court offered 
io withhold the assessment of interest until the final dis-
11usitin11 of the entire case if tried denovo and further 
I 
,,.<1rc the Appellants six months in which to repay the 
principal :mm received hy them. Respondent cannot con-
ceiYc rd any off er more generous than to offer Appellants 
tlir opportuHity to rxonerate themselves from any and 
nil contracts entered into between Respondents and 
.ippellants m1cl to put all of the issues which they com-
11lain of into a single lawsuit and proceeding. Having 
refused this chance, the Appellants should not now be 
i1earc1 to complain of inequities, injustices and unfair 
rlealing-s. The Respondent could not have made a more 
gc11c•rous offer to remedy whatever wrong Appellants 
fdt hefell them. 
POINT III 
TIIE~ TRIAL COURT'S FAILURE TO ENTER 
FTNDINGS OF FACT AND JUDGMENT ON 
1'~URNISHING APPELLANTS A GATE, RIP-
RAP AND CULVERT, IF ERROR, IS HARM-
L'BJSS ERROR AND A STIPULATION IN 
RFJCORD BY RESPONDENT'S COUNSEL 
RINDS RESPONDENT ON FURNISHING 
'rIIE ITEMS COMPLAINED OF. 
Rrspondent does not deny that it is obligated to pro-
1i1le the Appellants with a gate, certain rip-rap on a 
'trrarn crossing Appellants' property and a culvert to 
13 
permit crossing a ditch on Appellanh;' property. 'it 
r:rrial Court's failure to enter Findings of Fact and .fud~ 
ment on these items does not warrant a reversal of tlie 
entire case, however. Counsel for the Respondrnt stipu 
lated that these miscellaneous items ·would he furni~Jw11 
to Appellants, such stipulation hm'ing been made ill oper, 
court and appearing in the record, the Appellants WPri· 
afforded sufficient safeguard as to the stipulation liy ~Pe 
tion 78-51-32, U. C. A. 1953, which provides that under 
certain circumstances, counsel may hind his client. :l[o 1 ~. 
over, the Judgment of the lower court may he ame11derl 
to include the providing of miscellaneous items to pro 
ted the Appellants if this procedure is deemed nemsan. 
CONCLUSION 
In Yiew of the eYidenc<> pr<>sented in the ](:wpr Court 
and in \'iew of the manner in which the Court's dPcisi011 
was arriYecl at, Respondent respectfully suhmits that 
tlw trial Court's ruling was amply supported hy thr cri-
dence and the .Judgment of the lower Comt should lie 
affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
PHIL L. HANSEN, 
Attorne:-;' Genernl 
KENNETH 1\f. HTSATAKFJ 
Special Assistant Attorney 
General 
431 South Third East, Suite 10~ 
Salt Lake Cit~', Utah 8..J.111 
Attonrev for Rcs7w1ulc11I 
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